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“It’s humiliating that, for the last four years, it has seemed somehow unclear whether the 
German government’s stance on Greece differs significantly from the slogans printed in 
the tabloid newspaper Bild.” 
-- Ullrich Fichtner 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper speculates on the future of the euro. It uses Germany as a prism for the 
discussion about what might be done next to bolster the Euro. Researching the future—
always a challenging task—is made harder when multiple state actors contend for 
prominence on the basis of shifting coalitions at home, all while interacting at an 
international level. That said, almost everyone accepts that German choices will play the 
central role in the path ultimately chosen. This paper thus foregrounds Germany’s role in 
shaping the way ahead, and it does so through an explicitly political framework focused 
primarily on the electoral implausibility of an alternative German policy course.  
 
Any discussion about that way ahead presumes some effort to understand how we got 
where we are. Much analysis of Germany’s behavior during the slow motion unraveling 
and very partial repair of the Eurozone has dwelled on the perplexities of Germany’s 
modest response to a crisis of frightening proportions. Why has the biggest state so often 
had the smallest imagination? When not being charged with economic illiteracy2 or a 
sadistic streak, 3  the general explanation for Germany’s conservative, cautious, and 
incrementalist policies generally have been either ideological—with a heavy emphasis on 
the importance of ordo-liberal thought4 – or institutional – with the emphasis on ministerial 
prerogatives, federalist veto points, or active checks from the Constitutional Court.5 
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This paper adds an electoral dimension to Germany’s policy responses. Indeed, while 
almost nobody abroad is happy with German policy, almost nobody at home has been upset 
with it. Angela Merkel easily won her 2013 re-election bid over an opponent who offered 
little substantive alternative when it came to policy towards Europe and who is, in any 
event, now her coalition partner with an agreement that explicitly rules out debt 
mutualization. But the paper goes beyond considering merely ‘what voters want,’ for here, 
as so often, they want many things all at once. German voters overwhelmingly wish to stick 
with the euro (about 2:1 in summer 2013), but they also support other policies—
particularly austerity—that leave the euro highly vulnerable. Rather than merely stressing 
the obvious point that German voters are conflicted and confused, this paper injects an 
element of ‘time’ into what are too often otherwise static considerations of German policy. 
A focus on time and timing builds on a robust research agenda but one that has tended to 
emphasize day-to-day policymaking—especially at the EU level—rather than the 
exceptional and even crisis-driven considerations affected by timing.6  
 
Yet timing has mattered greatly in these exceptional circumstances brought on by the 
Eurocrisis. Accordingly, this paper considers both the ‘timing of politics’ and the ‘politics 
of timing’ under extraordinary decision-making pressure. In the former consideration, 
while German policymakers accept the need for a massive intervention in sovereign bond 
markets of other Eurozone members, they want to pick the optimal time of intervention to 
maximize the efforts of private actors and deter public and private behavior that might 
require more bailouts in the future. Their central focus is on moral hazard7, and their aim 
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is that their political priority—to save the euro—come at the ‘right’ time and not so early 
that policy mistakes remain uncorrected. In the latter consideration, a concern about the 
‘politics of timing’ means that German elites also feel they cannot intervene until they have 
properly prepared their voters. However, by the time elites have sold to voters a bailout of 
a certain envisioned size, the problem has grown larger such that the envisioned remedy is 
no longer adequate to the job. Here, the elite focus is centrally on the legitimacy of their 
policy choices.  
 
Adding to the difficulty, if one focuses primarily on the timing of politics, then patience is 
a virtue, and elites should wait and minimize future moral hazard concerns. If one focuses 
primarily on the politics of timing, however, then patience is a vice, as windows of 
opportunity for stemming the crisis slam shut, one after another. The broad point of the 
paper is that the first concern—to avoid cementing an unwise policy status quo in troubled 
Eurozone states—has consistently won out over the second—actually stemming the crisis 
of confidence in the Euro.8  
 
The argument proceeds in three interrelated steps. First, a fundamental and still very much 
unsolved problem in the European economy consists of imbalances in both trade flows9 
and financial markets.10 Second, while these imbalances contributed to the crisis in the 
Eurozone, their resolution—such as it is—has depended primarily on adjustment in the 
peripheral countries. Meanwhile, Germany, having benefited once as the imbalances 
accumulated, has benefited again from their subsequent consequences, including the ‘flight 
to safety.’ I call this ‘Germany’s exorbitant privilege.’11 Together, these benefits create 
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conflicting pressures. On the one hand, there is a strong bias toward the status quo that has 
benefitted Germany so handsomely. On the other hand, there is a clear recognition that 
others in Europe are struggling and the euro, and its benefits to Germany, is in danger. 
Germany resolves this dilemma by innovation on the institutions of euro-area governance 
flanked with a ferocious defense of fiscal austerity and structural reforms. One implication 
is that Germany’s exorbitant privilege has helped prevent the rise of an alternative 
discourse and justified policies that suppress growth in other states. Third, with the taming 
of the German boom and a 2013 election that strengthened the status quo on Germany’s 
European policy, we have reached an impasse. 12  Yet this impasse cannot be stable: 
Germany cannot run a persistent trade surplus, avoid meaningful fiscal transfers, and still 
have a monetary policy with an independent central bank and a no bailout-policy.13  
 
Do Something!  
 
Germany is beset on all sides by those who would have it ‘do something!’ The exhortations 
began with heads of government in Europe’s Mediterranean periphery, and extended to 
Hungary’s socialist prime minister in 2009,14 Poland’s liberal foreign minister in 2011,15 the 
U.S. president,16 the Italian prime minister and ECB President in 2012,17 and the European 
Commissioner for financial matters in 2013, 18  and the US Treasury and European 
Commission (again) in 2014.19 Some of this criticism is also present in the domestic debate. 
For example, in April 2010, Joschka Fischer’s Dusseldorf speech lamented Germany’s 
waiting on IMF approval before assisting Greece. Fischer paraphrased Heine: ‘Denk ich an 
[Europa] in der Nacht, bin ich um den Schlaf gebracht.’20 Vaclav Klaus, a very different 
ACES Cases 2014.3  Jacoby, p. 5 
 
politician, expressed in Berlin the next day a similar concern about German dithering. 
Helmut Schmidt’s 2012 Parteitag speech blasted the German government for not noticing 
or not caring that its policies were tearing Europe apart.21 Thus, there has been concern across 
the political spectrum, the European continent, and even the Atlantic.  
 
In the crosshairs of these complaints, one can forgive the Germans for feeling wounded 
and defensive.22 Most obviously, Germany has done ‘some things.’ Many scholars show 
Germany has done at least an average amount on the fiscal side compared to the rest of the 
OECD,23 especially when compared to the rhetorically activist but fiscally constrained 
France.24 Moreover, essentially non-stop summitry between spring 2010 and summer 2012 
left an impression in the minds of many German voters of well-nigh frenetic German 
activity. 
 
It is, however, hard to say exactly what Germany has done. Partly, this is down to the 
proclivity for European leaders to ‘repackage’ what they had already pledged in prior 
discussions. This criticism can certainly be leveled at the lengthy search for a new set of 
fiscal rules for the Eurozone states, but it also applies to the emergency bailout packages 
negotiated to date. For months on end, each summit ground out new pledges that, upon 
closer inspection, were composed substantially of old pledges.25  
 
Voters are confused. Estimates of the size of German commitments vary wildly. As an 
intermediate starting point, one could look at the €190 billion figure cited by the German 
Constitutional Court in its decision to allow the European Stability Mechanism.26 On the 
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other hand, by stressing Germany’s TARGET2 liabilities of around €600 billion, Hans-
Werner Sinn once claimed German exposure amounted to $1.3 trillion.27 Subsequent and 
regular revisions resulted in a general lowering of these estimates by his institute, such that 
they were pegged at €541 billion in June 2014.28  Yet since Germany’s primary tool has 
been loans rather than grants and since the loans—apart from bilateral loans to Greece of 
€53 billion in 2010—have all been raised on the markets, it is hard to know what 
Germany’s true exposure has been. In mid-2012, Business Week reported that only about 
€15 billion out of Greece’s €340 billion in loans came from Germany, though other sums 
did come from international organizations that Germany is party to, including the EU and 
the IMF.29 At the extreme, some have argued that none of the ‘northern’ European states 
have paid a single euro in aid through 2013.30  
 
With voters understandably anxious and confused, German policy elites confront European 
economic problems with several broad and generally reasonable (though not always 
explicit) assumptions in place: 1) Germany must help because it is the indispensable nation 
in addressing Europe’s economic woes; 2) Germany’s own economic and leadership 
capacities are finite; 3) Germany itself could be damaged by ill-designed rescue efforts; 4) 
German voters can be made to understand the first point—Germany is indispensable for 
crisis resolution—only if it is reassured the government understands the second and third 
points.  In simple terms, the logic – shared across wide swaths of the German elite – can 
be encapsulated in these four ideas: Germany can do some important things. It cannot do 
everything. The rescue cannot be allowed to mortally damage the rescuer. Whatever 
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Germany does must bear public scrutiny. The next section shows how these apparently 
sensible parameters have buttressed a reform argument that cannot work. 
 
The Imbalances Problem 
 
Mark Blyth has shown that in both the United States and Europe, a quintessentially private 
banking crisis has been rhetorically transformed into a crisis of ‘public’ debt.31 In an 
analogous but also complementary fashion, Europe has seen its substantial current account 
imbalances—again, phenomena that have their primary roots in private consumption and 
savings choices—recast as crises brought about almost exclusively by faulty political 
choices, whether of levels of government consumption or improper regulatory coddling of 
inefficient private producers. No country has done more than Germany to promulgate this 
understanding of the enduring economic misery in Europe. Debate in the German 
Bundestag continually invokes the Greek case as exemplary of all the troubled Eurozone 
states (see below). This understanding justifies a view that German advice must be 
followed before German money can do any good. At the same time, German officials have 
been keen to downplay new and more sober limits on financing current account imbalances 
as an independent source of stagnation. 32  This section explores the implications of 
Germany’s strong and sustained trade surpluses for the politics of crisis resolution—
implications that are likely to persist in some fashion going forward. On the ‘strong and 
sustained’ claim there can be little doubt. By ‘sustained’, I mean primarily that Germany 
has run a goods surplus every single year since 1951; by ‘strong’, I mean that this surplus 
was below 2% of GDP in only five years since 1950 and has been as high as 8%.33 
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The basic idea behind this ‘imbalances problem’ is relatively straightforward and, by now, 
well understood: as global liquidity increased in the early and mid-2000s, a significant 
amount flowed to Spain, Ireland, Greece, Portugal and other states where, despite rapid 
convergence in interest rates with Germany and others, somewhat higher yields were 
available.34 These capital inflows contributed to strong asset bubbles (Spain, Ireland), 
surging demand (Italy, Greece, Bulgaria), or both (Estonia, Latvia, Portugal).35 They also 
created permissive space for steady rises in unit labor costs, even as Germany’s stayed 
flat.36 As competitiveness eroded in these states, current accounts went heavily into deficit, 
which required additional capital inflow.37 Meanwhile, Germany’s deep strength in high 
quality manufacturing goods whose purchase was enabled by such liquidity provision led 
to sustained export booms in several manufacturing sectors.38 As loose monetary policy in 
the US and Europe boosted liquidity, initial German advantages in intra-European 
competitiveness were magnified, while the fruits of that competitiveness were recycled 
back into those countries requiring higher financing to sustain growing levels of 
consumption.39 
 
As noted, German officials resolutely deny that the surpluses of German manufacturing are 
a cause of the build up of debt in the European economies.40 There are two important 
consequences of the German denial that its permanent surpluses are a problem. The first is 
that it tends to lead German officials to overestimate the potential of their alternative 
solutions in substantive terms. The second is that it leaves Germans deeply uncertain about 
the timing of reforms in procedural terms. Again, these problems are quite novel and do 
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not fit easily into the theoretical discourse shaped by what we might think of as the 
“normal” timing challenges associated with the persistent lack of synchronization among 
the treaty mandates of the European Commission, Council, and Parliament.41 
 
In substantive terms, successive German governments have had an interest in maintaining 
the narrative that the Eurocrisis is one of public debt since the alternative interpretation—
that it is driven in substantial ways by underlying trade imbalances—suggests Germany 
may have to bear more of the burden of adjustment.42 Since trade deficits generally have 
to be financed by private debt, the alternative narrative opens Germany to the charge that 
it is private debt, not public debt, that most determines the problems in the Eurozone. This 
is why debates in the German Bundestag contain constant references to Greece—where the 
narrative of public profligacy is easier to substantiate—and few references to Spain, which 
had low debt-GDP levels and was running a 4% budget surplus at the onset of the crisis.43 
If Greece didn’t exist, the old CDU-FDP coalition would have had to invent it, as it plays 
the essential rhetorical purpose in their joint crisis narrative. Indeed, in a way, the populist 
Bild Zeitung has already ‘invented’ a Greece that consists almost exclusively of corrupt 
public officials and a private sector awaiting its early retirement. As German journalist 
Ullrich Fichtner wryly notes in this paper’s epigraph, it can be hard to tell in what ways the 
state’s official position differs. 
 
In addition to public debt, the German government also stresses a substantial 
competitiveness gap between Germany and others. This gap is said to result from 
unrealized structural reforms in the weaker countries, and the German government 
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routinely references prior German reforms as a positive model. Yet Germany’s own 
experience with structural reform in the boom period of the early 2000s is likely to be an 
exceptionally poor guide to such reform during the post-2008 bust.44 It is far easier to 
undertake structural reforms in a time when trading partners experience surges of growth 
since painful dislocations are quickly compensated by new employment. Moreover, the 
major German reforms of the early 2000s were accompanied not by state austerity but 
instead were conducted in a period in which Germany was breaking the Stability and 
Growth Pact rules with deficit levels well above 3%. German voters seem to elide both of 
these facts—first, that structural reform paid faster dividends when regional growth was 
strong and second, that such reforms were not accompanied by austerity but indeed by its 
opposite. Certainly, Germans have limited appetite for cutting government spending at 
home. In a 2013 Pew poll, German respondents were second only to Swedish ones in 
approving current levels of their government’s spending.45 This is good news insofar as 
Germany is not practicing even more extreme levels of austerity, but it tends to make 
Germans appear hypocritical in the eyes of other Europeans. Statements like CDU Chief 
Whip Volker Kauder’s that, ‘Europe now speaks German’46 add to this triumphalist tone 
while ignoring the fact that Germany’s sinking debt-GDP ratios have come more from 
strong growth than from austerity, while rising debt-GDP rates in the periphery come 
despite sharp cuts in government spending. 
 
Meanwhile, Germany’s policy prescriptions have powerful unproven assumptions. Take 
the assumption that government austerity does no great harm to general levels of economic 
activity. There is good evidence, however, that the effects of state austerity on growth are 
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contingent. In a period of normal growth, the effects of austerity might be low, between 
0.2 and 0.4% as estimated by the IMF. This means a 1% cut in public spending equates to 
a 0.2 to 0.4% decline in GDP. And yet when monetary policy is not playing an active role, 
the effects of cuts in public spending may be much higher, from 0.9 to 1.7% according to 
recent IMF 2012 estimates. The latter figure accords also with historical evidence from the 
Great Depression—the last time that monetary policy put interest rates at or near the zero 
lower bound—and suggests a figure of around 1.6%.47  
 
Would an alternative German government behave differently? In the short term, probably 
not. It is true that under a ‘Grand Coalition’ that included an SPD Minister of Finance, the 
German government in 2008-2009 had its own ‘Keynesian moment,’48 However, the fact 
that German stimulus spending was right at the OECD average should not obscure the clear 
reluctance of both parties to talk openly about stimulus. In late 2010, there was a very short-
lived effort by the SPD to propose a version of Eurobonds, but this quickly died. 49 
Rhetorically, the SPD acknowledges the imbalances issue. For example, party chair Sigmar 
Gabriel stated in December 2012:50 
 
It is not about having more Europe. It is about a different Europe, a Europe where innovation 
and competitiveness are actively promoted, and where one doesn’t simply believe that 
markets will do it, a Europe in which Germany does not use low wages and low taxes as a 
weapon against the competitiveness of its neighbors.… Of course the imbalance in Europe, 
especially our current account surpluses, are one cause of the problem. 
 
The problem is that the party understands this is an electorally dangerous message. The 
2013 SPD Party Conference virtually ignored the European issue, which played essentially 
no role in the 2013 campaign and led to no bold shifts in the two parties’ coalition 
agreement of December 2013. 
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Meanwhile, German officials generally treat the undeniable fact of significant imbalances 
as an irrelevance, dodging this important debate by posing ludicrous rhetorical questions 
about whether Germany is expected to ‘produce inferior goods’ as a way of ‘solving’ the 
imbalance issue. Given the imbalances noted, the intransigence of the German government, 
and the modest alternative agenda developed by the SPD, the scope for policy reform has 
been limited. More precisely, whenever Germany has innovated on the monetary policy 
side, it flanks this with stubbornly conservative policies on fiscal and structural issues. 
 
Why Deutschland Dithers: Four Scenarios 
 
Another way to put the ‘timing of politics’ claim is to say that it is too simplistic to charge 
Germany with pure obstructionism.51 Instead, the German dilemma in facing the prolonged 
European financial and economic slump is that they want to intervene neither too early, 
nor too late, neither too big, nor too small. Their reasons are easily understood from within 
the ordoliberal paradigm and moral hazard frame. If they are too early, German leaders 
fear they will exacerbate moral hazard problems. If they are too late, they increase the odds 
of contagion. If they are too big, they put German taxpayers on the hook for costs that 
others could and should bear. If they are too small, they run the risk of using up too much 
of their fiscal room for maneuver—‘keeping one’s power dry’ is also a metaphor in 
German—in an ineffective intervention only to need it later on.52 Thus, throughout the 
crisis, German elites have sought to convince German voters that they have a package that 
is both timely and appropriate. They have to be ‘in the right policy place at the right time.’ 
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If they can do so, they will have public support to put Europe on a better track. To date, 
however, the government has stayed consistently behind the curve, another metaphor that 
German policymakers themselves have often employed.53 
 
The ‘timing of politics’ dilemma grows from the basic political economy of these four 
scenarios. The ‘too early’ fear is that rent-seeking machine politics in the Eurozone 
periphery will not change their ways if rescue comes too quickly. High interest rates are 
the market’s way of delivering the reform message, and bailouts only blunt or muddle this 
message. German reluctance to jump in too early thus increases pressure for reforms. This 
scenario imagines the German state pitted against supposedly ‘austerity-weary’ peripheral 
states in an epic game of fiscal chicken. To blink is to endure another round of a self-
reinforcing dynamic in which peripheral governments resist the hard reform choices. These 
themes—modified only slightly for polite public discourse about one’s partners—are a 
staple of Chancellor Merkel’s periodic reports to the German Bundestag. She speaks of the 
need to export Germany’s basic ‘stability culture’ to the rest of Europe and of the urgency 
of structural reforms that have been too long delayed. Germany, the Chancellor argues, is 
prepared to take extraordinary steps to flank these domestic reforms, but the central reform 
agenda lies, in her telling, inside the Eurozone states in trouble. 
 
The ‘too late’ fear is that financial markets will lose confidence in those peripheral 
Eurozone governments and make the rescue more expensive than it would otherwise be. In 
the worst case, the rescue would be too expensive to contemplate, leading to a Eurozone 
breakup. This scenario posits the right policy combination will secure or restore investor 
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confidence. Germany long betrayed little obvious concern with this problem. Indeed, for 
the first two years of the euro crisis, Germany’s obsession with retooling the Stability and 
Growth Pact into the so-called Six Pack and other fiscal surveillance measures seemed to 
side step the necessary measures on the monetary side.54 As predictions of a euro break up 
multiplied in summer 2012 and bond rates for Spain and Italy approached 7%, however, 
the ‘too late’ fear began to take precedence. 55  With Merkel’s blessing of the Draghi 
proposal for OMT in summer 2012, the fear of ‘too late’ gained the upper hand over 
concerns about moral hazard, at least temporarily.56 
 
Germany’s ‘too big’ fear is that frightened Eurozone member states might agree on a 
massive intervention when a smaller, more targeted one would be preferable. Here, the 
political economy revolves around some of the same rent-seeking fears from the periphery 
that were present in the ‘too early’ scenario. But there is an additional worry that certain 
moves might work to the benefit of a few large banks but have relatively little beneficial 
effect for the rest of the European economy. In the worst case scenario, banks are given 
‘too big’ a boost, and they sit on it such that it still makes no appreciable difference to the 
regional economy, though it may make one or another balance sheets more healthy.57 In 
the German context, the Ministry of Finance experts’ report on ‘strategies for an exit’ of 
the federal government from ‘crisis-induced participation’ in banks crystallizes these 
concerns.58 
 
Finally, the ‘too small’ fear is focused on investor confidence and posits that while large 
interventions may shock the system back towards a virtuous circle, small and medium 
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interventions only eat up potential rescue resources without actually fixing the core 
problems. This became known as the ‘bazooka’59 debate, in which various EU-level rescue 
measures were judged inferior and inadequate. A second incarnation of the ‘too small’ fear 
is that some form of mutualization of new debt – for most Germans, a worrisome possibility 
raised in the 2012-13 discussion around banking union – might still be inadequate to relieve 
states of the crushing burden of older debts. Thus, while very expensive, some 
mutualization of future debt might be largely irrelevant to solving the ongoing Eurozone 
problems. 
 
Different combinations of these anxieties have surfaced repeatedly in the German debates. 
Hans-Werner Sinn has worried that is possible to go both ‘too big’ and ‘too early’ and, as 
a result, reward both rent seekers at home (mainly the banks) and abroad (mainly peripheral 
state governments) at one and the same time.60 ‘Too big’ and ‘too late’, by contrast, would 
likely allow some exposed counterparties to benefit from 11th hour desperation on the part 
of the government.61 Meanwhile, the logic of ‘too small’ is not rent seeking but rather that 
it is merely symbolic behavior. This opens the way to different flavors of ineffectiveness, 
depending on whether the ‘too small’ is ‘too early’ or ‘too late.’ For example, the important 
effect of ‘too small’ and ‘too early’ is to raise the number of market participants that hope 
for a bailout and, by sending confusing signals, increase the subsequent hold up problems. 
This has essentially become the mainstream German view of the May 2010 Greece 
package, which failed to include bail-in mechanisms and is seen to have set the wrong 
signal going forward that states would bear the full burdens of bank rescue. Germany’s 
main challenge is that it does not have the resources to experiment and to get the rescue 
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wrong in a big way and still have the capacity to come back and try again. This was already 
true during the period in which its growth and employment performance diverged wildly 
from other Eurozone members, and it is even more evident in times when its growth is far 
more modest. Whatever its strengths, it must choose very carefully the time and modality 
of its intervention.  
 
Meanwhile, German voters are almost completely ignorant of the imbalance issue in the 
European economy. German leaders have celebrated export success for so long that they 
have no effective vocabulary for problematizing export success, even if they were inclined 
to do so.62 In any event, they are not so inclined; acknowledging imbalances might threaten 
to shift some of the burden of adjustment to Germany as a matter of a fundamental course 
correction. Instead, German leaders have much preferred to contemplate various forms of 
assistance to manage the effects of imbalances but without taking steps to correct the 
imbalances themselves. To the extent Eurozone peripheral countries’ current accounts have 
come back into balance since 2009, this is due far more to import declines than to export 
gains.63  
 
Thinking Slow and Fast: German Patience and its Exorbitant Privilege  
 
To an extent, the claim that German officials have been resistant to fundamental changes 
in German policy is contradicted by the many Eurozone policy innovations that have 
already been tried with German support and sometimes its leadership. It’s certainly not 
correct to say that Germany gets whatever it wants in EU summits. In fact, time and again, 
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Germany has moved off of its initial positions—whether that was authorizing and then 
expanding the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF), making it permanent with 
European Stability Mechanisms (ESM), later allowing ESM to participate in direct bank 
recapitalization, allowing ECB purchases of government bonds on the primary and 
secondary markets (Securities Market Program or SMP), or agreeing to Draghi’s line to do 
‘whatever it takes’ and the subsequent Outright Monetary Transactions instrument that it 
spawned.64  
 
As a consequence, the outcome to understand is not German rigidity in any absolute sense. 
Instead, the pattern has been that the more institutional ground Germany cedes on the 
monetary side, the more determined it grows to exact changes on the fiscal and structural 
side. This is an underdeveloped insight in the literature so far, and it helps explain why we 
have the strange combination of frustration and even rage against ordoliberalism outside 
Germany and the simultaneous despair of many ordoliberals inside Germany.65 Every time 
there is a new concession to troubled Eurozone states, Merkel doubles down on the calls 
for fiscal rectitude and structural reform—calls that cannot all be met in electoral 
democracies. By flanking her institutional concessions in this way, Merkel has, so far, kept 
both the Constitutional Court and the voters on her side. 
 
The most important caveat to this generalization is the Court’s February 2014 ruling that 
the ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions violate German law that requires Bundestag 
approval of fiscal and economic policy. Indeed, while most proponents of OMT argue that 
the ECB could only fulfill its monetary policy mandate with a new instrument that could 
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fix the broken interbank lending market in crisis-hit countries, the Court took a different 
position, namely that OMT lay outside the ECB mandate because it put the Central Bank 
in the potential position of incurring losses in bond purchases that could hit national 
taxpayers without their direct approval.  
 
Thus, there has been policy innovation, but a hallmark of German policy has been slow 
and deliberate measures, often punctuated by mild backtracking or even outright reversal.66 
This section makes two points about this uneven trajectory. First, it notes coherent reasons 
for German delaying tactics. Second, it makes the point that Germany began reaping 
unexpected benefits of the crisis—what I call its ‘exorbitant privilege’—that actually made 
it harder to embrace a shift away from the status quo, further cementing this politics of 
delay. 
 
Citizens of the countries most afflicted by the Eurozone crisis are desperate for relief, but 
German policy has stressed incremental reforms of the Eurozone framework and, 
especially, the deeper constitutionalization of fiscal balances already agreed in earlier 
periods. Why the slow, painstaking reinvention of fiscal wheels when the problems 
evidently lie so much deeper? The German government has had several aims in buying 
time, such that the slow pace of reform is overdetermined. To be clear, the German 
government would love to solve the Eurocrisis and has, at times, clearly been desperate to 
do so. But it has judged that no available options were superior to the course it has chosen, 
and that course, because it required and still requires very extensive adjustment in the 
peripheral states, is understood to be a long-term project. 
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First, German delays ensure that fundamental reform impulses must come from the states 
whose financing models are most under threat. German delays ramp up—or at least fail to 
relieve—the reform pressure on governments in the Eurozone periphery.67 Second, moving 
slowly increases pressure on private counterparties to accept losses or ‘haircuts.’ Merkel’s 
insistence that private counterparties accept losses (‘adequate participation of private 
creditors’) in the second restructuring of Greek debt suggest this motive was already 
operative by the October 2010 Deauville summit, at the latest.68 Third, Germany sought to 
use delays to provide a window of time in which its own banks could get healthy after 
heavy exposure to the bonds of Southern European states.69 Finally, a fourth motive for 
buying time might have been the significant mismatch between Germany’s own very static 
financial regulatory practices and substantial new experiments in the financial sector over 
the 2000s. Germany has long sought to upload its domestic practices – in function if not 
always in form – to the European level. While this tendency admittedly had tapered off 
after the end of the Kohl governments, Germany has no appropriate system of financial 
regulation to upload.70 Instead, it has a badly fragmented financial supervisory system that 
is essentially a permanent tug of war between the Bundesbank and the Bundesanstalt für 
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht.71  
 
These are coherent reasons why a Germany eager to solve the Eurocrisis might still drag 
its feet on proposed reforms. As a matter of timing, they join with the complexities in the 
first section in which the German government’s obsession with moral hazard complicated 
efforts to find a solution. Influenced by this inclination towards incrementalism, as the 
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crisis has dragged on in the periphery while Germany enjoyed excellent labor market 
performance and strong exports, German officials have become more and more wedded to 
their favored narrative: they both celebrated Germany’s excellent record and grew 
increasingly bold in prescribing ‘German-style’ reforms for troubled Eurozone states.72 
 
The final point of this section is that to all the other reasons for policy conservatism, we 
have to add that the striking success of the German economy has reinforced Chancellor 
Merkel’s conservatism and that of German voters. Merkel’s policies towards the Eurocrisis 
have been clearly successful in a political sense, as voters credited her government with 
solid management of the German economy and of her European policies. In fact, Pew Data 
(2013) show a massive gap between German attitudes and those in much of the rest of 
Europe when it comes to the Eurocrisis.73 Satisfaction with the economy in Germany was 
66 points above the EU average, while smaller gaps separated Germans from the EU 
average on personal finances (26%), European integration (28%) and German leadership 
(48%). Only in Germany did a majority (54%) still believe that economic integration would 
strengthen national economies. Perhaps related, German respondents also were, by far, the 
most likely to support further centralization of power in the EU. Meanwhile, Merkel is 
Germany’s most popular politician. Her approval ratings generally ran a whopping 30% 
above her challenger throughout the 2013 electoral season.  
 
If Merkel has benefitted politically, Germany itself has benefitted economically to an 
extent. In fact, as the Eurozone periphery countries began to falter, Germany began to 
benefit in certain ways from the stress and strain in other parts of the Eurozone. By far the 
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most important of these is the bottoming out of interest rates in Germany. Ten-year rates 
on German bonds went from above 3% to just over 1% in spring 2013 as the ‘flight to 
safety’ produced negative real interest rates that dramatically reduced German debt service 
costs. One estimate, by the Allianz insurance company, calculated German interest savings 
at around €67 billion over several years.74 Other estimates have been lower, but no one 
disputes that these benefits have accrued (indeed, the government plays them up in public 
reports, presumably as a way of countering the fear that German generosity has gone too 
far). Of course, these low rates have stimulated private investment in Germany as well, and 
area where rates have been strikingly low for a long time. Another very real benefit has 
been the influx of skilled labor into Germany from more distressed Eurozone economies. 
Germany’s net labor inflow was 420,000 in 2012.75 Finally, one could point to the benefits 
to Germany of the weakness of the Euro itself. While the Euro has strengthened in the wake 
of the OMT/’whatever it takes’ announcements, there seems little doubt that had Germany 
had a national currency, its booming economy in after 2010 would have led to substantial 
appreciation. Instead, its export conditions have remained healthy, an advantage Germany 
shares with a few other (mostly Northern European) states in the Eurozone. 
 
To be sure, this German version of ‘exorbitant privilege’ is clearly not of the same scale or 
duration as that long enjoyed by the United States.76 But it has been an unexpected boon 
that makes the struggles in the Eurozone periphery beneficial to the German economy. Of 
course, my argument is not that Merkel’s government designed these advantages. Instead, 
the point is that the flight-to-safety dynamics made even more popular, policies of restraint 
that were already wildly popular in Germany. With Eurobonds and true fiscal federalism 
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off the table and with austerity and structural reforms predictably failing to fundamentally 
alter the crisis dynamics, the search resumed for another tool. 
 
Can Supranational Banking Union Save the Eurozone? 
 
The first major section of the paper stressed the imbalances of the past, and the second 
stressed the current predicament. This paper’s final section looks to the future and focuses 
on the plans for a banking union to complement monetary union. This paper has been 
animated by the irresolvable tension between a Germany that genuinely seeks a solution to 
the European financial crisis and a Germany that is determined to minimize the costs of 
such a solution. The result has been halting and contradictory policy. The last section 
showed that in addition to German fears of being called on to rescue other Eurozone states, 
the crisis in the periphery has actually brought very concrete benefits to Germany, further 
undermining the political incentives for policy change. The paper’s final section projects 
this tension forward, looking in particular at the banking union as emblematic of 
Germany’s policy timing and substance dilemmas. Once again, we see a Germany that 
tends to slow walk the crisis and emphasize fiscal rectitude and structural reform as the 
solution to the Eurocrisis. 
 
While the intergovernmental route to economic union is likely to continue the pattern of 
incremental change, the banking union announced in summer 2012 was, at least in 
principle, due to move much more quickly. A primary trigger for banking union was the 
awkward combination of supranational banking activity and national regulation, which, in 
ACES Cases 2014.3  Jacoby, p. 23 
 
the post-2008 period, had led to widely diverging credit conditions such that similar firms 
in different states had very different access to capital.77 Moreover, banking union promised 
to break the ‘doom loop’ between banks and sovereigns and, as such, promised a way 
forward without the Eurobonds that Merkel had ruled permanently out of bounds and 
whose rejection had been codified in her party’s coalition agreement with the Social 
Democrats.  
 
As currently conceived, banking union is to rest on four interrelated pillars: regulation, 
supervision, deposit insurance, and resolution. These pillars are, however, at very different 
stages of construction, and some may not happen at all. The outlines of the supervision 
dimension are fairly clear. Ultimate responsibility for supervision rest with a single entity, 
the European Central Bank, which has developed a new apparatus to engage in so-called 
asset quality reviews of systemically important banks and will take over supervision of 
these banks by November 2014. This handover will create what Wolfgang Schäuble refers 
to as a ‘timber-framed’ banking union.78 If he has his way, this will be followed, at a later 
point, by substantial change of the European treaties to pave the way for a ‘steel framed’ 
banking union. German support for the SSM has been contingent upon some 
accommodation of the politically important savings banks (Sparkassen), whose local 
structure means they have connections in every electoral district in the country.  
 
This will be a major undertaking. Veron shows that while the existing treaties can support 
envisaged legal innovations in both prudential regulation (article 114 of TFEU) and SSM 
(article 127(6) TFEU) – though it is likely that smaller-scale treaty adjustments will be 
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undertaken at a later date – the legal basis for both European-level resolution and deposit 
insurance mechanisms are lacking and would require a treaty change for a robust basis.79 
My interviews in the German Ministry of Finance and with CDU and SPD officials confirm 
that while the EU has been able to engage in constitutional innovation though 
intergovernmental treaties in cases such as the ESM and the Fiscal Compact, the legal basis 
sought for resolution, in particular, is likely to be more robust and to be sought through the 
main EU architecture and not as separate agreements. Indeed, in July 2013, the Finance 
Ministry even obliged formal transposition of an EU provision that had direct effects.80 
 
After German objections led to the imposition of a minimum threshold, the ECB will 
supervise all banks with more than €30 billion in assets.81 This will correspond to more 
than 130 banks that hold 80% of Eurozone banking assets.82 Starting in late 2013, a process 
of ‘publically-led triage, recapitalization, and restructuring’ commenced, leading to the 
ECB’s development of a ‘manual’ by March 2014.83 The daunting technical challenges 
have been made somewhat easier by the ECB’s better access to clean information than was 
true of the earlier European bank ‘stress tests’ run by the European Banking Authority 
headquartered in London. A major impediment, however, lies in the fact that as the ECB 
uncovers banking problems, the member states will still be responsible for resolving them. 
This ‘handover problem’ is critical.84 The ECB has every incentive to ensure that the banks 
it will take under its supervision have a healthy basis. But the financial resources that will 
likely be required in any vigorous assessment would need to come from member states. 
Germany’s preference for strictly rules-based regimes for handling such recapitalization 
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and resolution issues is also unlikely to prevail given the likely substantial involvement of 
politically-sensitive creditors—including national pension funds. 
 
German opposition has also prevented use of the ESM for bank recapitalization, a situation 
that seems likely to persist until after the handover of authority to the SSM in 2014.85 An 
important consideration will be the extent to which legacy debts can be identified, legally 
realized and nationally resolved prior to such a handover. The most credible forward-
looking situation would be one in which rigorous European-level reviews and ample 
national restructuring and resolution funds take place in advance. These are, of course, 
exactly the circumstances most likely to strike hard at the most fiscally-exposed Eurozone 
states and to open the possibility that, for example, senior unsecured creditors may get far 
more favorable treatment in fiscally solid states than in those states with more severe 
funding pressures. That said, ESM ought to be available to backstop these states, if not, as 
noted, the banks directly. Moreover, Veron argues that markets have, to an extent, priced 
in large if necessarily uncertain resolution costs for certain Eurozone members and thus 
resolution costs ought not to lead to a loss of market access.86 
 
On the Single Resolution Mechanism, we have clear conflict between the Commission and 
the ECB on one side and the German government on the other. Part of the problem is that 
there is little clarity on the size of potential bank losses. Financial journalists have estimated 
such losses at €1-1.6 trillion, though the higher estimates seem to assume bad assets will 
equate automatically to the need for new capital.87 Assuming some asset recovery plus 
available loss provisioning, others come up with figures closer to €400 billion—still 
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daunting but not as cataclysmic as €1.6 trillion.88 An additional worry is that any credible 
asset quality review and stress test would seem to require frank acknowledgment that 
holders of bonds of some Eurozone governments face the risk of at least partial default. 
This would imply an end to the practice of rating these bonds as zero-risk.89 And yet any 
such move would raise future borrowing costs for governments, possibly sparking 
financing problems that would hammer both governments and the banks.90 As of summer 
2014, however, European banks had generally made surprising progress towards raising 
capital in advance of the fall stress test scenarios. The Financial Times reported that 
European Tier one capital levels are nearing 12% on average, roughly the same proportion 
as among American banks.91 Averages can hide a lot of variation, and it seems likely that 
some important banks may fail the tests. Perhaps a more pressing medium term challenge 
will be to profitability levels in the sector.92 
 
Such difficulties are emblematic of a host of potential problems for a single resolution 
authority. When the European Commission announced its plan for such a European-level 
resolution authority in July 2013, two problems immediately surfaced. The first was 
explicit German opposition to the idea of a European authority in the first place on the 
grounds that banking problems were a matter for sovereign states to regulate. Merkel and 
Hollande released a paper to this end just prior to the Commission announcement.93 
Second, the Commission failed to call for the use of the ESM as an initial backstop for such 
a mechanism.94  
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One major reason for Germany’s opposition to several facets of the banking union is the 
receding of pressure on the Eurozone and the growing sense they can muddle through. 
Berlin has clearly backed away from any idea of an early intergovernmental conference 
that would be required for major change to the European treaties. Berlin will still seek the 
smaller changes that would allow them to have economic union—essentially, Merkel 
hopes, in the form of a kind of Lisbon Process with teeth. One can draw up the 
intergovernmental contracts noted earlier under existing treaties, but to either punish or 
reward (with EU budget funds) contracting states would require treaty change, and there is 
currently little evidence that Germany could find many member states willing to sign up 
for such contracts. Germany has also dropped the idea of a ‘super-commissioner’ to enforce 
budgetary discipline, a Schäuble idea that Merkel never supported. Germany perceives 
other risks from moving ahead expeditiously. The European Parliament might oblige a 
formal convention—they did not do so for ESM—in part because a larger convention might 
open the door to greater powers for the EP.95 Meanwhile, other member states have their 
own wish-list for a treaty change, some uncongenial to Germany, and this seems, for now, 
to have convinced the German government to trudge forward without a treaty change.    
 
Its overall position puts Germany substantially at odds with the European Central Bank. 
Jörg Asmussen, who was an economic advisor to Merkel before joining the ECB Executive 
Board, had made an explicit call for a ‘European Backstop’ in a speech in London just prior 
to the Commission announcement.96 The Commission proposal, though it does foresee a 
European agency, would not have resources to help close an ailing bank. Germany’s 
alternative proposal is for a resolution mechanism that coordinates those of the member 
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states. On the one hand, this position perfectly replicates its general orientation against 
exposing German taxpayers to banking resolution problems in other states. On the other 
hand, it does nothing to address the issue that many national programs are woefully 
underfinanced and completely incapable of resolving troubled banks in the states in 
question. Several academic studies warn that European-level supervision and national-
level resolution will lead to misaligned incentives.97 They mirror the position of the ECB 
as articulated by Asmussen that separate national resolution funds will invite jurisdictional 
fights that hamper rapid responses to banking crises.98 
 
Given the main thrust of this paper, it is comprehensible why German politics should be 
fixated on slowing or preventing the establishment of a new authority on deposit insurance 
and resolution. These activities are traditional areas of national discretion and—and this is 
more relevant to Germany—pooling liabilities might expose Germany to bank losses in 
other member states. While this paper has stressed that German behavior and German 
rhetoric are often out of synch with one another, banking union appears to be an area where 
apparent German refusal is indeed built upon a foundation of actual German refusal. 
 
Conclusion: Why it so hard to get the right Eurozone policy at the right time? 
 
This paper has tried to make sense of the future of the Eurozone by looking at Germany’s 
institutional constraints and at the beliefs of ordinary citizens. If Germans sometimes 
appear dogmatic today, this is a superficial phenomenon. To be sure, there is a veneer of 
populist Bild Zeitung-fueled patter about the need for all of Europe to follow the German 
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model. But this patter is as self-deceptive—because conditions for German structural 
reforms in the early 2000s were far more supportive than today—as it is self-
congratulatory, and many Germans do doubt their government has found the key to the 
Eurocrisis in a bracing set of structural reforms of state and market. This uncertainty and 
tentativeness is sufficient to keep Germany from enacting policies that might have (and 
perhaps might still) refashion the Eurozone in a more sustainable way. And because the 
ambivalent and uncertain side of Germany dithers, it gives an additional advantage to those 
countrymen who defend the untenable status quo, which, in its crudest form, is simply 
‘prosperity for us; austerity for you.’  
 
This paper made this argument by covering three main issues: the ‘problem’ of trade 
imbalances, which German leaders and voters do not perceive as a problem at all and 
around which there has been very little serious debate; the exorbitant privilege that 
unexpectedly accrued to Germany during the Eurocrisis and that helps prevent a major 
course correction by Germany; and the partial banking union now being constructed in a 
period of relative calm that has reduced German incentives for a more far-reaching design. 
The paper showed that each of these already complex issues was made more complex by 
issues of timing. This kind of timing issue goes well beyond the very useful theoretical 
literature on what one might call the temporal inconsistencies of inter-institutional 
articulation at the EU level.99 Instead, this paper has focused on extended nightmares of 
timing that have arisen between member states and between constituent parts of the EU in 
a setting that is anything but routine. 
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Going forward, there is every reason to think the imbalance problem—deeply anchored in 
German fascination with exports and grounded in deep strengths in German 
manufacturing—will persist in some form. It seems much less likely that the various 
aspects of Germany’s exorbitant privilege will endure. The flight to safety saved Germans 
tens of billions in financing costs, but can negative real interest rates for one country and 
punitive ones for another be a stable outcome? This seems doubtful. And the boom in 
immigration, while helpful to Germany, may also prove short-lived. An OECD study 
suggests most Greek and Spanish immigrants return to their home country within a year of 
moving to Germany.100 So what if the imbalance stays, the privilege goes, and the banking 
union—in any event, a mechanism to deal with future problems but with virtually nothing 
to say about the resolution of past problems—never really arrives in any full-fledged way? 
 
Until new crises emerge, it seems the current muddling is foreordained. German voters 
have, very recently, heartily approved it and would be unnerved by any decisive steps by 
the new German government that broke from this course. The current path keeps the 
pressure for adjustment almost exclusively on other countries, and this is seen as entirely 
correct in the German debate, owing to the self-evident vice of the deficit countries and 
self-evident virtue of the surplus countries. While there has been some recent real wage 
growth in Germany, public finances remain focused on balance. Indeed, a recent IMF 
report on Germany felt compelled to caution that the country should not be 
‘overperforming on consolidation.’ 101  Additionally, the December 2013 coalition 
agreement among the three governing parties foresees only very modest expansionary 
measures of about 0.1% of GDP annually.102 
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Meanwhile, export outlets outside the Eurozone have grown in attraction while established 
Eurozone customers may have low purchasing power for years to come. Germany’s 
ferocious export boom that started around 2003 eventually led, by 2007, to a more than 
€100 billion external surplus with the Eurozone at a time that Germany’s surplus with non-
EU states was under €40 billion. But times have changed. As the Eurozone stagnated, 
demand from outside the EU boomed. By 2012, the positions had nearly reversed, with 
non-EU 27 states running a nearly €100 billion deficit with Germany while the Eurozone 
deficit had shrunk to about €55 billion.103 Germany has very successfully diversified its 
export portfolio, and this seems to have eliminated some of their urgency to resolve the 
Eurozone crisis.104 The only problem is the specter of trade and currency battles with 
trading partners around the globe. 
 
But if the muddling is undeniable, it’s not clear the Eurozone will really get through. 
Whether and how Germany should try to fix the Eurozone also depends on one’s view of 
the medium run. Even presuming the ‘imbalances’ approach stressed here is correct, it is 
actually not obvious that this euro can be repaired. For the most part, the imbalances 
argument tends to be used by those who question German sanity. The form it takes is 
‘Germany profited enormously from this euro, and this is why its austerity mania is 
hypocritical (because Germany gained all along from others’ indulgent spending), unwise 
(because it fails to do more to rescue the system that has made it prosperous), and tactically 
clumsy (because it synchronizes deflationary impulses).  
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But one could also accept the imbalances approach and simply say that while it was good 
while it lasted, the euro experiment has hit its endpoint and German leaders have concluded 
that it can’t be reformed for another round. To be sure, this position is one where the glass 
is acknowledged to be half empty: much of the apparent export success of recent years will 
have to be compensated by German taxpayers resolving, recapitalizing, or bailing out the 
German banks that helped finance it.105 But, according to this view, German efforts to 
strengthen and retain the Eurozone would just mean throwing good money after bad.  
 
The politics of timing started with the ‘intrusion’ of the German voter into the domain of 
financial politics, something that has typically been an elite domain in Germany. Banking 
bailout politics are now so expensive, however, that mass politics has forced its way in. 
But while German voters are most certainly now paying attention, the dilemma is that by 
the time politicians convince them of the need to support a certain financial remedy, the 
Eurozone problems have grown to such a size that this remedy no longer works. A new 
remedy is required, and the process of explaining the need for it begins again, only this 
time with increasing voter skepticism that the elites know what they are talking about. 
 
The resulting populist discourse, along with the institutional divisions in German politics, 
has persistently granted Merkel an important edge in her negotiations. Typically, at the 
more than 30 EU summits since 2009, Merkel bargains hard but often makes some 
concessions. A breakthrough of some kind is announced and a certain collective sigh of 
relief is registered in Europe. At that moment, other actors in German politics often begin 
to counter or at least delay what Merkel has agreed. Such actors include the Bundesrat, the 
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Constitutional Court, and, above all, the Bundesbank. These are not entirely quiet rearguard 
actions, and if they were, they would lose one of their most important effects: to calm 
German voters.  
 
All of this reverses the usual picture of the ‘semi-sovereign state’ in Germany. 106 
According to Peter Katzenstein’s formulation, policymaking in Germany moves slowly 
and deliberately because a plethora of actors are constitutionally empowered to participate 
in decision-making. Once the system produces a decision, however, the general assumption 
is that the very corporate partners who gave their assent in the first place will carry it out. 
What was a hindrance in conception becomes a help in execution. What we are seeing now, 
however, is a different, in some ways opposite, story. The Chancellor goes to summits and, 
however grudgingly, agrees to things, which then get walked back in succeeding weeks. 
Take early summer 2012, when many European leaders thought Merkel had agreed that 
the ESM could directly fund ailing banks. In subsequent weeks, the Bundesbank strongly 
disputed this, leaving other European partners wondering. Or take the OMT, which appears 
to have brought months of relative calm to the markets. The German Constitutional 
Court—as discussed above—has suggested OMT is not compatible with German law. 
Because the Court asked the ECJ to weigh in, many commentators have assumed a more 
Euro-friendly court can bless the OMT. But this is not really what Karlsruhe’s decision 
says. Instead, the subtext is far more to call on the ECJ to adapt the OMT to Germany’s 
needs.107 If the message is ‘fix it or we will nix it,’ there may be much more trouble ahead 
for OMT.  Finally, the apparent breakthroughs on banking union in 2012 now appear much 
less secure once one moves beyond the supervision pillar. Thus, does German indecision 
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persist, as does the misery in Europe. There is little reason to expect it to abate any time 
soon. 
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